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Abstract
Recently, the vulnerability of DNN-based audio
systems to adversarial attacks has obtained the in-
creasing attention. However, the existing audio ad-
versarial attacks allow the adversary to possess the
entire user’s audio input as well as granting suffi-
cient time budget to generate the adversarial per-
turbations. These idealized assumptions, however,
makes the existing audio adversarial attacks mostly
impossible to be launched in a timely fashion in
practice (e.g., playing unnoticeable adversarial per-
turbations along with user’s streaming input). To
overcome these limitations, in this paper we pro-
pose fast audio adversarial perturbation generator
(FAPG), which uses generative model to gener-
ate adversarial perturbations for the audio input in
a single forward pass, thereby drastically improv-
ing the perturbation generation speed. Built on
the top of FAPG, we further propose universal au-
dio adversarial perturbation generator (UAPG), a
scheme crafting universal adversarial perturbation
that can be imposed on arbitrary benign audio input
to cause misclassification. Extensive experiments
show that our proposed FAPG can achieve up to
167× speedup over the state-of-the-art audio ad-
versarial attack methods. Also our proposed UAPG
can generate universal adversarial perturbation that
achieves much better attack performance than the
state-of-the-art solutions.
1 Introduction
As the current most powerful artificial intelligence (AI)
technique, deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely
adopted in many practical applications. Despite their cur-
rent success and popularity, DNNs suffer from several se-
vere limitations, especially the inherent high vulnerability
to adversarial attack [Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Carlini and
Wagner, 2017], a very harmful attack approach that imposes
well-crafted adversarial perturbation on the benign input of
DNNs to cause misclassification. Being originally discov-
ered in the image classification applications, to date the vul-
nerability of DNNs, especially various types of adversar-
ial perturbation generation methods [Kurakin et al., 2016;
Poursaeed et al., 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017], has
been extensively investigated in many image-domain appli-
cations.
Considering the rapidly increasing use of DNNs in mod-
ern audio-domain applications and systems, such as smart
speaker (e.g., Apple Homepod, Amazon Echo) and voice as-
sistant (e.g., Siri, Google Assistant, Alexa), recently both ma-
chine learning and cyber security communities have begun
to study the possibility of adversarial attack in the audio do-
main. Some pioneering efforts [Carlini and Wagner, 2018;
Neekhara et al., 2019] in this topic have demonstrated that,
the idea of injecting inconspicuous perturbations into benign
voice inputs to mislead the DNN-based audio systems, is not
just conceptually attractive but also practically feasible. To
date, several work have reported the successful adversarial at-
tack in different audio-domain applications, including but not
limited to speaker verification [Meng et al., 2019; Chen et al.,
2019], speech command recognition [Alzantot et al., 2018;
Gong et al., 2019], and speech-to-text transcription [Carlini
and Wagner, 2018; Yuan et al., 2018].
Limitations of Prior Work. Although the existing work
have already demonstrated the feasibility of audio adversarial
attack, they are still facing several challenges. More specif-
ically, the state-of-the-art adversarial attack approaches, no
matter in image domain or audio domain, make several ide-
alized assumptions on the temporal setting, especially having
large time budget for generating adversarial perturbation and
owning authorization to observe the entire benign input. For
image adversarial attack, these simplified assumptions usu-
ally hold since the benign input images are typically static
and constant all the time. However, audio signals have dif-
ferent temporal behaviors: 1) In practical audio applications,
the benign inputs are typically quickly-streaming voice in-
put; therefore, the existing audio adversarial attacks, which
rely on time-consuming iterative optimization approaches
such as C&W [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] or genetic algo-
rithms [Alzantot et al., 2018], are too slow to launch the
attack against these real-time audio processing systems. 2)
Also, the inherent sequential nature of audio signals makes
it impossible for the adversary to generate adversarial pertur-
bation during input-streaming phase, since the existing per-
turbation generation methods are based on full observation of
the entire input. Consequently, the current audio adversarial
attack can only be performed against the recorded or play-
back voice instead of real-time audio signals, thereby making
them impractical for various real-world audio-domain attack-
ing scenarios.
Technical Preview and Contributions. To overcome
these limitations, in this paper we propose to use generative
model to generate adversarial perturbations in the audio do-
main. This generative model learns the distribution of ad-
versarial perturbations from training data in an offline way.
Once being well trained, the generative model can generate
audio adversarial perturbations very quickly, thereby unlock-
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ing the possibility of realizing audio adversarial attack in the
real-time setting. Our main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• We, for the first time, propose a generative model-based
fast audio adversarial perturbation generator (FAPG). Un-
like existing methods requiring considerable adversarial
perturbation generation time, our proposed FAPG gener-
ates the desired audio adversarial perturbation through a
well-trained generative model Wave-U-Net [Stoller et al.,
2018] in a single forward pass, thereby significantly accel-
erating the perturbation generation speed.
• We propose to integrate a set of trainable class-wise em-
bedding feature maps into FAPG to encode all the label
information in the audio data to a unified model. Unlike
conventional generative model-based image-domain ad-
versarial attacks, which require different generative models
for different targeted classes, the proposed audio-domain
FAGP can generate adversarial perturbation targeting at
any adversary-desired class using a single generator model.
Such reduction significantly saves the memory cost and
model training time if the adversary expects to launch at-
tacks with multiple target classes.
• Built on the top of input-dependent FAPG, we further pro-
pose an input-independent universal audio adversarial per-
turbation generator (UAPG). UAPG is able to generate
a single universal audio adversarial perturbation (UAP),
which can be applied and re-used on different benign audio
inputs without the need of input-dependent perturbation re-
generation. In addition, since the universality of UAP ex-
ists across different benign inputs, such important charac-
teristic removes the prior constraint on needing to observe
entire input for perturbation generation, thereby enabling
the realization of real-time audio adversarial attack.
• We evaluate the attack performance using FAPG and
UAPG against a speech command recognition model on
the Google Speech Commands dataset [Warden, 2018].
Compared with the state-of-the-art input-dependent attack,
our FAPG-based attack achieves 167× speedup with the
comparable attack successful rate. Compared with the ex-
isting input-independent (universal) attack and real-time,
our UAPG-based attack achieves an averagely 34% and
20% fooling rate increase, respectively.
2 Fast Audio Adversarial Perturbation
Generator (FAPG)
2.1 Motivation
Dilemma Between Speed and Performance. As analyzed
in Section 1, one of the most challenging limitations for
the existing audio adversarial attacks is their slow gen-
eration process for adversarial perturbations. To be spe-
cific, the current commonly adopted underlying adversarial
perturbation-generating approaches, such as BIM [Kurakin et
al., 2016], C&W [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] and genetic al-
gorithms [Alzantot et al., 2018], are built on numbers of iter-
ations to optimize or search the perturbations. Although this
iterative mechanism can bring high attack performance, the
corresponding required generation time is prohibitively long,
such as seconds or even hours for producing one well-crafted
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Figure 1: Overall architecture of the proposed FAPG.
perturbation. On the other hand, the existing one-step pertur-
bation generation methods, e.g. FGSM [Goodfellow et al.,
2014b], though enjoy the advantage on fast generation, suf-
fer the poor attack performance problem, such as relatively
much lower attack success rate (ASR) than their iteration-
based counterparts.
Generative Model-based Solution in Image Domain.
Such a dilemma between the speed and performance of adver-
sarial perturbation generation is not an audio-specific prob-
lem, but also widely exists in the image domain. To address
this problem, recent image-domain studies [Poursaeed et al.,
2018; Song et al., 2018] have proposed to utilize genera-
tive models, such as Generative adversarial network (GAN)
[Goodfellow et al., 2014a] and autoencoder [Vincent et al.,
2008], to accelerate the generation of image adversarial per-
turbations. Different from the multi-step optimization-based
approaches (e.g. C&W and BIM), the generative model-
based solutions aim to learn the distribution of adversarial
perturbations from the training images. After being well
trained, the generative model performs one-step generation
from input image to adversarial perturbation, where such pro-
cess is essentially a fast one-pass forward propagation over
the generative model, thereby significantly improving the
generation speed for image adversarial perturbations.
Challenges in Audio Domain. Such progress on image
domain naturally encourages the exploration of using genera-
tive model to accelerate audio adversarial perturbation gener-
ation. However, audio signals have a huge difference from
images. A speaker’s voice is essentially a 1-D time-serial
signal that contains very important sequential order informa-
tion. Also, unlike well-defined fixed-size image data, voice
data typically have very different signal lengths even from the
same user and in the same dataset. Besides these new audio-
specific challenges, generative model-based audio adversarial
perturbation also suffers the same class-specific model prepa-
ration problem of image-based counterparts: To be specific,
when utilizing generative model to perform targeted attack,
for each target class, an individual generative model has to be
trained for specific use. Considering the number of classes
can be very high, e.g., hundreds or even thousands, the re-
quired memory cost for launching the attack is very high.
2.2 Proposed FAPG: Construction & Training
Overall Architecture. To address these challenges, we pro-
pose FAPG, a fast audio adversarial perturbation generator, to
launch the audio-domain adversarial attack in a rapid, high-
performance and low-memory-cost way. Figure 1 illustrates
the overall architecture of FAPG, which contains a genera-
tive model (G(·)), e.g., Wave-U-Net [Stoller et al., 2018],
and multiple class-wise embedding feature maps. During the
training phase, both the generative model and embedding fea-
ture maps are jointly trained on the training dataset. After
proper training, given a benign audio input and a target class
label yt that the adversary plans to mislead the DNN classi-
fier (F (·)) to, the corresponding audio adversarial perturba-
tion can be quickly generated via performing inference of the
benign input over the well-trained generative model, where
the embedding feature map for the target class yt is concate-
nated to one intermediate feature map of G(·). Next, we de-
scribe the details of the used generative model and the set of
embedding feature maps as follows.
Audio-specific Generative Model. Generative model is
the core component of FAPG. Although various types of gen-
erative models have been widely used in image-domain appli-
cations, they are not well suited for the use in FAPG due to the
inherent difference (e.g., sequence order and varying length)
between image and audio signals. To address these chal-
lenges, we adopt Wave-U-Net [Stoller et al., 2018], which
was originally used for audio source separation, as the un-
derlying generative model of FAPG. Wave-U-Net is a type of
special CNN containing 1-D convolutional, decimal down-
sampling blocks and linear interpolation up-sampling blocks.
Such inherent encoder-decoder structure makes Wave-U-Net
exhibit strong distribution modeling capability. Meanwhile,
its unique design of first-layer 1-D convolution and up/down
sampling blocks also enables Wave-U-Net can naturally cap-
ture the temporal information from 1-D varying-length data.
Class-wise Embedding Feature Maps. The purpose of
using k-class embedding feature maps is to ensure that a sin-
gle generative model can be re-used for attacks against dif-
ferent target classes instead of class-specific design. To this
end, those class-aware embedding feature maps, denoted as
ε = {E1, E2, ...Ek}, are designed to be trainable, and each
of them corresponds to one target class. After joint training
of generative model G(·) and these embedding feature maps
ε, the label information for class yt is encoded in the corre-
sponding feature map Et. Then during the generation phase
Et is concatenated with one intermediate feature map ofG(·)
to craft the adversarial perturbation for target class yt. In our
design, Et has the exact same shape of the intermediate fea-
ture map that it will be concatenated. To be specific, Et is
typically aligned with the intermediate feature map at the in-
tersection between the encoder and decoder parts of Wave-U-
Net. This is because the feature map has the smallest size at
this position, and thereby minimizing the storage cost of the
corresponding Et.
Training Procedure of FAPG. Next we describe the train-
ing procedure of FAPG, or more specifically, the joint train-
ing for G(·) and ε. To be specific, in the forward propagation
phase of the entire training procedure, for each batch of input
voice dataX , we first randomly select one target class yt, and
fetch the corresponding embedding feature map Et. This se-
lected feature map is concatenated into the generative model
G(·) to form an overall modelGt(·). A forward pass onGt(·)
Algorithm 1: Training Procedure of FAPG
1 Require: Training dataset χ = {x(1), ..., , x(n)}, class label
{y1, ..., , yk}, DNN classifier F (·), noise constraint constant
τ
2 Result: Trained FAPG: generative model G(·), class-wise
embedding feature maps ε = {E1, ..., Ek}
3 Initialize G(·), ε and τ
4 for number of training iterations do
5 for number of steps do
6 X ← minibatch of m samples from χ;
7 yt ← get random target ∈ {y1, ..., yk};
8 Gt(·)← G(·) embeds with Et ∈ ε;
9 δt ← Clip(Gt(X), {−τ,+τ});
10 X′ ←X + δt;
11 ypred ← F (X′);
12 Loss←
1
m
∑m
i (CrossEntropy(y
(i)
pred, yt) + β ·
∥∥∥δ(i)t ∥∥∥
2
);
13 minimize Loss to update G(·) and Et;
14 decrease τ
15 end
16 end
will be performed with input X . The result, denoted as δt,
is clipped to the range of {−τ,+τ} to constrain the gener-
ated perturbation δt to be imperceptible, where τ is a thresh-
old parameter. Notice that according to our experiments, τ
should be set as a relatively large value initially, and grad-
ually decreased during the training procedure. Empirically
such adjusting scheme can bring better training convergence.
After perturbation δt is calculated from the generative
model, it is imposed on the benign data to form the adver-
sarial input, which can cause the misclassification of DNN
classifier F (·). Then, the loss function, which is the key of
the entire training procedure, is formulated as follows:
Loss(X, yt) = −yt · log(F (X +Gt(X))) + β · ‖Gt(X)‖2,
(1)
where the first and second terms are the cross-entropy loss
and L2 loss, respectively, and β is a pre-set coefficient. The
existence of L2 loss in the entire loss function is to control
the attack strength and make the generated adversarial pertur-
bation imperceptible.
Consequently, in the backward propagation phase both the
generative model G(·) and the current selected embedding
feature mapEt are updated simultaneously by minimizing the
loss function. Notice that for each batch data, Et is randomly
selected. Therefore after rounds of iterations the generative
model G(·) itself learns the general distribution of adversar-
ial perturbations, and different Et learns the encoded infor-
mation for each specific target class. The details of the entire
FAPG training procedure are summarized in Algorithm 1.
3 Universal Audio Adversarial Perturbation
Generator (UAPG)
3.1 Motivation
Limitations of FAPG. As presented in Section 2.2, FAPG
provides a fast solution to generate audio adversarial pertur-
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Figure 2: Overall architecture and training scheme of the proposed
UAPG.
bations. However, it is essentially an input-dependent gen-
erating approach, which means its perturbation generation
mechanism is based on the observation of the entire benign
input. Such an assumption cannot be satisfied in many real-
time applications considering the characteristics of streaming
audio signals.
Universal Audio Adversarial Perturbation Generator
(UAPG). To address this limitation, we further develop uni-
versal audio adversarial perturbation generator (UAPG) to
craft audio-domain universal adversarial perturbation (UAP).
As revealed by its name, a single universal adversarial per-
turbation can be applied and re-used on different benign in-
puts to cause mis-classification without the need of input-
dependent perturbation re-generation. Such unique univer-
sality completely removes the prior constraint on observation
of the entire input, and makes UAPG very suitable to launch
real-time audio adversarial attack with zero time cost.
Challenges of UAPG Design. The attractive benefits of
UAP have already led to some work on studying image-
specific UAP [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Poursaeed et
al., 2018]. Lending the methodology used in those research
progress in image domain, recent work [Vadillo and Santana,
2019; Neekhara et al., 2019] report audio-domain UAP gen-
erating methods for speech command recognition and speech-
to-text systems, respectively. Besides, [Gong et al., 2019]
also proposes a technique to realize real-time audio adversar-
ial attack without using the entire voice input, which has the
similar effect as using UAP.
Despite these existing efforts, designing a robust and pow-
erful UAPG is still non-trivial but facing two main chal-
lenges: 1) the experimental results show that the current
audio-domain UAPs typically have much lower attack per-
formance than the input-dependent perturbations; and 2) the
attack enabled by some audio-domain UAPs are only untar-
geted attack, where the adversary cannot precisely obtain the
desired target results.
3.2 Proposed UAPG: Construction & Training
Overall Scheme. Different from existing studies, we aim to
devise a UAPG which could achieve high targeted attack per-
formance. Figure 2 shows the idea: we produce an input-
dependent UAP based on a signal vector U , which is to be
trained to exhibit a certain degree of universality. After ini-
tialization, U is used to produce UAPs, and it is being updated
in an iterative way by gradually improving the universality of
derived UAPs across different training data samples. Finally,
an effective UAPG is able to be constructed via evolving well-
trained U .
From FAPG to UAPG. The underlying method used for
generating UAPs is our proposed FAPG. Intuitively, FAPG
learns to estimate the distribution of adversarial perturbations
instead of iteratively optimizing the perturbation for a spe-
cific audio input. Therefore the FAPG-generated perturba-
tion naturally exhibits better universality than that the one
comes from non-generative method. Moreover, our FAPG is
designed to integrate various target classes information into
a single generative model, thereby enabling the capability of
producing targeted universal perturbations.
Training Procedure of UAPG. We then introduce the
training details to facilitate an effective UAPG. In general,
to formulate an input-agnostic universal attack, our goal is to
find a universal perturbation υt to satisfy:
argmax F (x(i) + υt) = yt for most x ∼ χ. (2)
The training procedure of UAPG is shown in Algorithm 2.
We aim to generate a single universal perturbation υt via
the well-trained G(·) and the corresponding Et ∈ ε, which
can be obtained from the well-trained input-dependent FAPG.
Different from input-dependent scenario, the audio input sig-
nals is now replaced by a single trainable vector U . Then the
universal perturbation is returned and imposed on benign data
to craft the adversarial audio example. Through feeding such
an adversarial audio into the DNN classifier F , we can update
U by minimizing the following loss function:
Loss = −yt · F (X +Gt(U)) + β · ‖Gt(U)‖2, (3)
where the first and second terms represent the cross-entropy
loss and L2 loss, respectively. With the guidance of the above
loss function, we optimize U by iteratively applying the de-
rived υt across the entire training data. In particular, in order
to construct a UAPG that can be universally applied to any
target class, at each training step, a random target class is se-
lected to help U to learn inter-class representations. After
constructing the unified U , the universal perturbations com-
puted by our UAPG could be effectively applied on any input
data to fool the DNN model in an audio-agnostic way, with-
out requiring re-generating adversarial perturbation for each
individual audio input.
4 Attack Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Methodology
Target Model and Dataset. We evaluate the proposed
FAPG and UAPG on a state-of-the-art Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) based speech command recognition sys-
tem [Sainath and Parada, 2015], which has been widely used
as the baseline model in many previous studies of audio-
domain adversarial attacks and defenses [Alzantot et al.,
2018; Abdoli et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2018]. Moreover, we
use the crowd-sourced speech command dataset [Warden,
2018] containing 46, 278 utterances including 10 represen-
tative speech commands (i.e., “yes”, “no”, “up”, “down”,
Algorithm 2: Training Procedure of UAPG
1 Require: Training dataset χ = {x(1), ..., , x(n)}, class label
{y1, ..., , yk}, DNN classifier F (·), generative model G(·),
class-wise embedding feature maps ε, noise constraint
constant τ
2 Result: Trained UAPG
3 Random initialize U
4 for number of training iterations do
5 for number of steps do
6 yt ← get random target ∈ {y1, ..., yk};
7 Gt(·)← G(·) embeds with Et ∈ ε ;
8 UAP υt ← Clip(Gt(U), {−τ,+τ}) ;
9 X ← minibatch of m samples from χ;
10 X′ ←X + υt ;
11 ypred ← F (X′) ;
12 Loss←
1
m
∑m
i (CrossEntropy(y
(i)
pred, yt) + β · ‖υt‖2);
13 minimize Loss to update U ;
14 end
15 end
Type FGSM BIM C&W FAPG
FR 48.36% 97.24% 98.9% 97.77%
ASR 17.83% 92.26% 96.16% 93.55%
Time 0.051s 1.36s 9.16s 0.055s
Table 1: Comparison of the overall performance of audio-dependent
attacks.
“left”, “right”, “on”, “off”, “stop”, and “go”). The audio files
are stored with a sample rate of 16kHz. Prior to the speech
command recognition model, 40-dimensional MFCC features
are extracted from the audio input. We randomly separate the
dataset into training and testing set with a ratio of 8 to 2, and
the command recognition accuracy of this baseline model on
the testing dataset is 89.2%.
Evaluation Metrics. (1) Fooling Rate (FR) is used for
evaluating both targeted and untargeted attacks, which shows
the ratio of the number of adversarial examples that lead to
a false classification and the total number of adversarial ex-
amples; (2) Attack Success Rate (ASR) is only used for eval-
uating targeted attacks, which is the ratio of the number of
succeeded attacks and total attack attempts; (3) Distortion
Metric: We quantify the relative noise level of δt with re-
spect to the original audio xi in decibels (dB): D(xi, δt) =
20log10
max(δt)
max(xi)
.
4.2 Audio-dependent Targeted Attack via FAPG
FAPG Generator Implementation. We use model M1 of
Wave-U-Net [Stoller et al., 2018] to construct our FAPG.
Specifically, our model contains 5 down-sampling blocks and
5 up-sampling blocks. The feature map size of the last en-
coding layer is 500, which is also the size of each additional
class-wise embedding feature map. FAPG is trained on the
same training set as used for the training of the target speech
command recognition model. A total number of 10, 000 train-
ing steps are conducted using Adam optimizer with a batch
size of 100 and β = 0.1. The clipping bound τ is initially set
to 0.1 and gradually reduced until it reaches to 0.03.
Speedup of Generation Time. We compare the time con-
Figure 3: Class-wise ASR performance of FAPG (%).
sumption of our proposed FAPG with one-step FGSM [Ku-
rakin et al., 2016] and two iteration-based attack methods,
i.e., BIM [Kurakin et al., 2016] and C&W [Carlini and Wag-
ner, 2017]. For fair comparison, the parameters of FGSM are
tuned to produce the same magnitude of adversarial distortion
(measured in dB) as FAPG, and the configuration of other at-
tacks follows previous work [Yu et al., 2018]. We evaluate
each type of attack by launching attacks alternatively target-
ing at every speech command and record the average perfor-
mance over all testing samples. The average time consump-
tion of adversarial perturbation generation is measured on a
Nvidia Tesla V100 GPU. As shown in Table 1, the proposed
FAPG can achieve a comparable high ASR as the iteration-
based methods such as BIM and C&W while only requiring
the time of the single-step method (i.e., FGSM). The above
results show an adversarial perturbation generation speedup
of 166× compared with C&W based attack.
Class-wise Attack Performance. Figure 3 illustrates the
detailed class-wise performance of our FAPG. Specifically,
each cell shows the ASR of an original-target command pair
(cases with the same original and target command are ex-
cluded). As we can see, our FAPG can retain a high ASR
for nearly all original-target command pairs, with only 1 case
has ASR below 80%. In addition, the average perturbed audio
distortion is measured as −30.46dB, which is approximate
the difference between the ambient noise in a quite room and
a person talking [Carlini and Wagner, 2018].
Memory Cost Reduction. To show the memory cost re-
duction brought by the proposed feature embedding maps,
we first train 10 generative models targeting our 10 speech
commands. These well-trained models lead to a 23.8 MB
memory consumption. To achieve the same attacking task,
our proposed FAPG generator, however, only requires a sin-
gle generative model with 10 class-wise embedding feature
maps. Therefore, the implemented FAPG only takes around
2.4 MB memory. We show the feasibility of using a single
generative model with a k-class embedding feature maps to
generate the adversarial perturbations targeting at k classes.
This significantly reduces the storage cost of the generator,
especially when the adversary has hundreds or thousands of
target speech commands.
Audio-dependent
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Universal
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Figure 4: Visualization of audio-dependent perturbations and uni-
versal perturbations targeting at different speech commands.
UAPG UAP-HC[Vadillo et al., 2019]
Original
Speech FR ASR FR ASR
“yes” 87.12% 83.14% 66.24% -
“no” 96.48% 91.84% 66.23% -
“up” 95.70% 93.92% 61.89% -
“down” 88.28% 83.78% 44.82% -
“left” 89.32% 88.04% 0.00% -
“right” 84.16% 80.55% 55.84% -
“on” 86.97% 85.08% 57.39% -
“off” 90.87% 86.51% 68.60% -
“stop” 87.97% 86.63% 43.48% -
“go” 93.38% 89.60% 63.34% -
Average 90.03% 86.90% 52.78% -
Table 2: Comparison of the effectiveness of universal attacks.
UAPG is our proposed targeted universal attack; UAP-HC is an un-
target universal attack.
4.3 Audio-agnostic Universal Attack via UAPG
UAPG Implementation. The proposed trainable vector U is
initiated as the same size of the original audio input. A pre-
trained FAPG model from section 4.2 is used to construct the
UAPG. The training of U involves the same training set as
used for speech command recognition model. A total number
of 8000 training steps are conducted using Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 1e−4 and a batch size of 100. We
set τ to 0.03 which corresponds to an average distortion of
−30.21dB of the generated adversarial perturbations.
Class-wise Universal Attack Performance. To investi-
gate the effectiveness of UAPG, we plot the audio-dependent
perturbations generated by FAPG as well as the audio-
agnostic perturbations generated by UAPG using principal
component analysis (PCA) [Wold et al., 1987], as shown in
Figure 4. We only show the adversarial perturbations target-
ing at five commands for the sake of illustration. Although
the universal perturbations are created without accessing the
distribution of real speech commands, all universal pertur-
bations locate within the manifold of corresponding audio-
dependent perturbations generated for the same target class.
This demonstrates that our UAPG can efficiently learn the in-
herent adversarial representations with respect to each target
command.
Table 2 shows the performance comparison of universal at-
Method UAPG RAA
Attack Scenario Targeted Untargeted
Emitting Delay 0s 0.01s
FR 73.48% 43.5%
ASR 40.01% -
Table 3: Comparison of real-time attack. UAPG is our proposed
targeted universal attack; RAA is a state-of-art real-time attack.
tacks between our proposed UAPG and the state-of-the-art
audio universal attack, UAP-HC [Vadillo and Santana, 2019]
which is based on DeepFool algorithm [Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al., 2016]. To evaluate UAPG attack, we generate 10 univer-
sal perturbations targeting at our 10 speech commands, re-
spectively. For each type of original command, we will add
the corresponding perturbation attempting to make it to be
recognized as the rest of 9 commands. Additionally, since
UAP-HC is untargeted universal attack regardless of the tar-
get target command, we only report the average FR in this
case. Specifically, UAP-HC could only achieve up to 68.60%
FR, which indicates the perturbation generated through UAP-
HC has limited generality over other speech commands. In
comparison, our proposed UAPG shows a significant im-
provement in universality over HAP-HC by achieving an av-
erage FR of 90.03% and ASR of 86.90%.
Comparison with Other Real-time Attack. We also
compare the performance of the proposed UAPG with the re-
cent real-time adversarial attack (RAA) [Gong et al., 2019].
For fair comparison, we launch the attack in a more practical
black-box setting. We re-train our UAPG on another speech
command recognition model (i.e., CNN-3 model [Zhang et
al., 2017]) and evaluate the real-time attack performance on
the same target speech recognition model as used in previous
sections. As shown in Table 3, due to the design structure,
there is a 0.01s emitting delay to apply adversarial noises for
RAA whereas our UAPG is able to launch the real-time with-
out any time delay. Moreover, RAA could only achieve an un-
targeted real-time attack with up to 43.5% FR. However, our
UAPG, even under targeted attack setting, is able to achieve
a FR of 73.48% and an ASR of 40.01%. Therefore, the pro-
posed UAPG could generate more robust universal perturba-
tions enabling the realization of real-time attacks in practice.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a fast and universal adversarial at-
tack on speech command recognition. By exploiting Wave-U-
Net and the class-wise feature embedding maps, our proposed
FAPG can launch fast audio adversarial attack targeting at any
speech command within a single pass of feed-forward prop-
agation, which results in an adversarial perturbation genera-
tion speedup of over 167× comparing to the state-of-the-art
solutions. Moreover, built on the top of FAPG, our proposed
UAPG is able to generate universal adversarial perturbation
that can be applied on arbitrary benign audio input. Extensive
experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of
the proposed FAPG and UAPG, making the real-time attack
against speech command recognition systems possible.
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